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Abstract
Whilst there is much discussion about the stringency of environmental regulations and the
variability of industrial environmental performance in different countries, there are very few
robust evaluations that allow meaningful comparisons to be made. This is partly because data
scarcity restricts the ability to make ‘like for like’ comparisons across countries and over time.
This paper combines data on benzene emissions from Pollution Release and Transfer Registers
with data on industrial production from oil reﬁneries to generate normalized measures of
industrial environmental performance across eight Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development countries and the EU-15. We ﬁnd that normalized emissions levels are improving
in nearly all countries, and that there is some convergence in emissions performance between
countries, but that there are still very signiﬁcant variations across countries. We ﬁnd that average
emissions levels are lower in Japan and Germany than in the USA and Australia, which in turn
are lower than in Canada and the EU-15, but we note that average emissions in the EU-15 are
signiﬁcantly affected by particularly high emissions in the UK. These ﬁndings have signiﬁcant
implications for wider debates on the stringency of environmental regulations and the variability
of industrial environmental performance in different countries.
S Online supplementary data available from stacks.iop.org/ERL/9/074019/mmedia
Keywords: environmental regulation, environmental standards, industrial environmental
performance, pollutant release and transfer registers, comparative policy analysis
1. Introduction
There is much discussion on the stringency of environmental
regulations and the variability of industrial environmental
performance in different countries. Industrial groups fre-
quently claim that regulatory standards for the minimum
levels of industrial environmental performance are too high
and that this impacts on their competitiveness (cf Otte-
well 2012), whilst environmental groups frequently claim that
regulatory standards and the associated levels of industrial
environmental performance are too low and that this impacts
on public health and environmental quality (cf Friends of the
Earth 2013). These debates often have a signiﬁcant political
impact—calls for greater levels of environmental protection
regularly run into concerns about the impacts of regulation on
employment, innovation and competitiveness. These concerns
become particularly acute where globalization and liberal-
ization mean that investment and industrial activity can more
easily move towards less heavily regulated countries.
Holzinger et al (2011) argue that in recent decades there
has been a convergence in the environmental standards being
adopted by policy makers in developed economies. This
convergence could be driven by the internationalization of
environmental policy with countries agreeing to adopt similar
international standards (Busch and Jörgens 2005), by policy
learning and the diffusion of policy instruments and approa-
ches from country to country (Jörgens 2004), or by the dif-
fusion of private standards and new environmental
technologies and management practices (Dolowitz and
Marsh 1996). From an environmental perspective, it is hoped
that there is convergence around higher environmental
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standards, with countries gradually adopting higher standards
over time, but there are also concerns that the competitive
implications of environmental policy are leading to a ‘race to
the bottom’ and convergence around lower standards (Hol-
zinger and Sommerer 2011).
Based on the results of large scale surveys of expert
opinion, Holzinger et al (2011) argue that there has been
convergence around an upward trend in environmental stan-
dards, and that there has been mobility in international
rankings with some laggard countries which had lower
environmental standards catching up with and sometimes
over-taking the leaders that historically had the higher
environmental standards. Over time, the EU has moved from
a laggard to a leader and the above argument is often put
forward in the EU, where the received wisdom is that the EU
has become a leader on environmental protection and where
concerns are frequently expressed that EU industry has been
put into a competitive disadvantage by over-regulation
(Scheelhaase et al 2010).
Despite the widespread importance of the debate on the
stringency of environmental regulations and the variability of
industrial environmental performance, there are very few
robust evaluations that allow meaningful comparisons of the
actual outcomes of environmental regulations in different
countries to be made. One of the reasons for this is that data
scarcity commonly restricts the ability to make ‘like for like’
comparisons of regulatory outcomes and industrial perfor-
mance across countries and over time. Different data sets are
available in different countries, there is a lack of consistent,
continuous data over time, and it is hard to generate nor-
malized measures of performance that enable meaningful
comparisons to be made (see Gouldson and Sullivan 2007).
However, such evaluations of regulatory outcomes and
industrial performance are critically important. Whilst we
might expect regulatory standards to impact directly on
industrial performance, it is all too evident that governments
can adopt tough regulatory standards on paper and then fail to
translate them into practice (see Gouldson and Murphy 1997,
Jordan 1999). For standards to impact on environmental
performance, and then on environmental quality and public
health, they have to be implemented and enforced, and
regulated companies need to comply with them. Whilst some
companies can be expected to go beyond compliance (Gun-
ningham et al 2004), for example when there are economic
reasons for them to do so, when implemented and enforced
we can expect regulatory standards to set a minimum level for
industrial environmental performance. These levels of per-
formance therefore reﬂect important ‘regulatory realities’, but,
surprisingly, they are very rarely evaluated, particularly
through international comparative research (Gouldson and
Murphy 1997).
In this paper, we seek to address this gap by analyzing
emissions of benzene from oil reﬁneries in various Organi-
sation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
countries. We adopt this focus for a number of reasons.
Reﬁneries have been present in a relatively common form in
many countries for many years, and the basic activities of
reﬁneries generate benzene emissions that have been heavily
regulated in many countries since the 1970s. There is there-
fore a meaningful basis for both international and historical
comparison. To conduct such an analysis, we require emis-
sions data for a large number of regulated sites in a range of
countries over a long period of time. Such emissions data is
available through Pollution Release and Transfer Registers
(PRTR). In order to develop normalized measures of perfor-
mance that take account of varying scales of production, we
also require site-speciﬁc data on the productive capacities of
each site. This data is available for reﬁneries through various
publically available data sets on the energy industry. Whilst
there is a basis for comparison and access to data for this
particular sector and pollutant, extensive searches suggested
that there are very few other sectors and pollutants where
these requirements would have been met. Whilst of course we
are aware that we cannot necessarily draw wider conclusions
from such a focused analysis, we argue that the results could
offer some rare insights that could be of great relevance in
widespread and politically charged debates that are often
characterized by a lack of evidence.
2. Scope, data sources and methodology
2.1. Scope and focus
The research in this paper was conducted using emissions
data from various PRTRs. PRTRs are catalogues or registers
of potentially harmful releases to air, water and soil (Bün-
ger 2012). They ﬁrst emerged in the US, where the Toxics
Release Inventory Program was established in 1986 under the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
(see EPA 2012). Since then, PRTRs have been adopted in
numerous industrialized and a growing number of developing
countries (Kerret & Gray 2007). Following the US example,
the Canadian National Pollutant Release Inventory was cre-
ated in 1994, with Australia setting up its National Pollutant
Inventory in 1998 and Japan its PRTR in 2001. In the EU, the
European Pollutant Emission Register (EPER) was estab-
lished in 2000 but was subsequently replaced by the European
Pollutant Release and Transfer Register (E-PRTR) in 2007.
The geographical and temporal scope of the analysis in this
paper is determined by the presence (and the dates of incep-
tion) of the PRTRs that provide access to the required emis-
sions data. We therefore include the US, Canada, Japan,
Australia and the EU-151. We also break the EU-15 data
down for those EU member states (France, Germany, Italy,
the UK) with more than ﬁve reﬁneries and where both
emissions and capacity data were available. We look at the
EU-15 rather than the wider EU as the early EPER did not
provide data from the newer member states that joined the EU
after 2004.
PRTR data can provide the basis for examining pollution
burdens and trends over time. Consequently, they can be
1 Member states that were part of the European Union prior to 2004, namely
Germany, Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, Luxemburg, Belgium, Netherlands,
Greece, Sweden, Finland, Austria, Denmark, Ireland and the United
Kingdom.
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especially useful tools when conducting comparative analyzes
within countries (Sullivan and Gouldson 2007). The data in
PRTRs is typically that which is reported to regulatory
agencies by regulated industrial sites. In most settings, the
data would have come from monitoring protocols approved
by regulatory agencies, and companies would commonly face
legal sanctions if they were found to have misreported data.
However, there is certainly scope for variations in the scope
and quality of the monitoring and reporting processes that
generate PRTR data—for example there have been con-
troversies in some settings about the reporting of emissions
during accidents or phases of maintenance (Ozymy and Jar-
rell 2011) and there have been suggestions that some reg-
ulatory agencies may be more demanding or rigorous in their
approach to reporting and to the enforcement of associated
standards than others (see e.g. Konisky 2009). PRTR data
may also be incomplete—the PRTR schemes of different
countries started at different times, include different sectors
and some do not report every year. PRTR data is also pre-
sented as yearly aggregated emissions, making it difﬁcult or
impossible to use the data to assess emissions levels on any
particular day (i.e. during an incident) or to link it to max-
imum permissible limits and ambient air quality standards
with shorter time periods. Even so, PRTRs do provide the
best data that is available on the emissions performance of
some key sectors, and for some relatively homogenous sec-
tors and emissions streams they can enable some robust
comparisons of performance to be made both over time and
between countries.
Within the conﬁnes of the data made available through
PRTRs, we focus on oil reﬁneries. In 2010, there were 661
reﬁneries in the world, with a total reﬁning capacity of 87.2
million barrels per calendar day (bcd). Focusing on reﬁneries
in those countries with established PRTRs, this study includes
data on 275 reﬁneries with a reﬁning capacity of 38.7 million
bcd in that year, i.e. 41.6% of world reﬁneries and 44.4% of
world reﬁning capacity (see ﬁgures 2.1 and 2.2 in the sup-
plementary material). For the US, the study captures over
94% of reﬁneries and 91% of the total reﬁning capacity in
2010. For Australia and Japan, it includes all operating reﬁ-
neries and capacity in that same year. For Canada, it covers
95% of reﬁneries and 93% of reﬁning capacity. For the EU,
the study covers 54% of reﬁneries and 64.7% of EU-15
reﬁning capacity. The study includes data on emissions from
only those reﬁneries that were operating continuously from
the date when PRTR data became available. This has pro-
vided us with continuous data for 22 years for the US, and for
16, 12 and 10 years for Canada, Australia and Japan
respectively. Far less consistent data is available for the EU,
however, as initially it was only available for 2001 and 2004
and then annually from 2007 onwards. In the dataset we only
consider reﬁneries with information available on both emis-
sions and reﬁning capacity. As this information is not avail-
able for a number of EU reﬁneries, this explains why
coverage of EU reﬁneries and reﬁning capacity is at a much
lower level than for all the other countries in this study.
We also focus on benzene emissions. Benzene is classi-
ﬁed as a human carcinogen (Bulka et al 2013), and is among
the most widely monitored and intensely regulated air toxics
in the world. It is a naturally occurring aromatic hydrocarbon
that is a component of crude oil and is released as part of the
reﬁning process. All oil reﬁneries risk emitting benzene, and
control of benzene emissions from reﬁneries has long been
subjected to regulation in developed countries.
2.2. Data sources, methods and assumptions
The data sources used in this study are outlined in table 1. Oil
reﬁneries are located in many countries—and given their size,
scale and strategic importance they tend to remain operational
over many years. No minimum size has been set for reﬁneries
included in this study since their reﬁning capacity can of
course change over time—as can their raw material
Table 1. PRTR Data Sources.
Country PRTR data source Years
No. of reﬁ-
neries in
studya
United States US Toxic Release
Inventory http://
www.epa.
gov/tri/
1988
onwards
123, 122b
EU-15 France
Germany
Italy UK
European Pollu-
tant Emissions
Register
(EPER); Eur-
opean PRTR
(E-PRTR) Data
for both avail-
able at: http://
prtr.ec.
europa.eu/
2001 and
2004;
2007
onwards
EU-15—51,
47 France
—6, 10
Germany—
10 Italy—
12 UK—
9, 8
Australia Australian
National Pollu-
tant Inventory
http://www.npi.
gov.au/
1999
onwards
8, 7
Canada Canadian National
Pollutant
Release Inven-
tory http://
www.ec.gc.ca/
inrp-npri/
1995
onwards
17
Japan Japan PRTR (data
in Japanese
only) http://
www.env.go.jp/
en/chemi/prtr/
prtr.html
2001
onwards
31, 30
a
Where there are two numbers in this column, they represent the number of
reﬁneries for which data is available for the ﬁrst year and in 2010.
b
While data was available for 123 and 122 reﬁneries for 1990 and 2010
respectively for the US, a number of reﬁneries in Texas and California are on
split sites, where reﬁning takes place on two closely associated sites, under
the same ownership, but which are physically divided by a road, for example.
These are dealt with separately according to the EIA but are combined in TRI
emissions data. As a result, the number of US reﬁneries shown in ﬁgure 1 is
based on the TRI reports (114 and 112 in 1990 and 2010 respectively).
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feedstocks (e.g. the type of crude oil they reﬁne), their pri-
mary product streams (e.g. the petroleum, kerosene or other
products they produce) and their application of different
process and control technologies or managerial approaches.
Whilst we take account of variations in capacity over time, we
do not take account of the other variable factors listed above
as there is no consistent data available on these. Further
information on all country coverage of this study is provided
at tables 2.1 to 2.3 in the supplementary material.
To normalize emissions data to take account of the scale
and productive capacity of different reﬁneries (and changes in
scale over time), we draw on data on reﬁnery capacity. Data
on reﬁnery capacities for all countries other than the US was
obtained from the Oil and Gas Journal (OGJ) Databooks until
2005 and OGJ Reﬁning Surveys from 2006 onwards (see
OGJ, various years). For US reﬁnery capacities, data was
obtained from the US Energy Information Administration
(EIA) Petroleum Supply Annuals (see EIA various). Capacity
is used as a variable rather than production as data on actual
production levels is not available. Capacity and production
are likely to differ, for instance because of downtime for
maintenance or because of accidents. By using capacity
ﬁgures, we make the assumption that all reﬁneries should
have similar levels of downtime over time.
Using emissions and capacity data, we produce a nor-
malized measure of emissions for individual reﬁneries in each
year. This is calculated by dividing total benzene emissions to
air (in kilograms) by reﬁning capacity measured as barrels per
calendar day (bcd). We assume that benzene emissions are
monitored and reported in the same way in each of the
countries (and within those counties in each of the states or
provinces) included in the study. Most fundamentally, given
the potential issues with PRTRs described above, we assume
that the emissions data provided through the PRTRs in each
of the countries included in the study provides a sufﬁciently
robust basis upon which to make meaningful comparisons of
emissions performance both over time and between countries.
3. Findings
The main ﬁndings of the analysis are presented in ﬁgure 1. As
can be seen, there is a very signiﬁcant variation in the average
normalized emissions levels in the different countries. Japan
is by far the best performing country with average normalized
emissions of no more than 0.016 kg bcd−1 in any year, stable
levels of average performance over time and a worst per-
forming reﬁnery emitting 0.072 kg bcd−1 in 2010. Germany is
the second best performing country overall with average
normalized emissions of 0.018 kg bcd−1 in 2010, with per-
formance having improved from 0.085 in 2001 and 0.044 in
2007. The worst performing German reﬁnery in 2010 emitted
0.041 kg bcd−1. In 2010, Japan and Germany achieved aver-
age normalized emissions levels that were less than half those
of any other country. Australia is the third best performing
country, with average normalized emissions improving from
Figure 1. Comparison of normalized emissions measure for reﬁneries in OECD Countries, 1990–2010 (kg benzene/bcd capacity). Note that
where two numbers are given in brackets for each country, this represents the number of reﬁneries included in this study in the ﬁrst year for
which data was available and in 2010 (see also ﬁgure 3.1 in supplementary material).
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0.165 kg bcd−1 in 2001 to 0.050 kg bcd−1 in 2010. The worst
Australian reﬁnery in 2010 emitted 0.141 kg bcd−1. The US is
the fourth best performing country, with steady falls in
average emissions per unit of capacity from 0.209 kg bcd−1 in
1990 to 0.041 kg bcd−1 in 2010. The worst performing US
reﬁnery in 2010 emitted 0.404 kg bcd−1. Ranked seventh,
eighth and ninth respectively are Canada, the EU-15 and the
UK for 2010. These had average normalized emissions levels
that were approximately 7, 8 and 14 times higher than those
of Japan and Germany. The UK has the worst emissions value
for a single reﬁnery within the EU-15 for all years except
2001 (when a Swedish reﬁnery had an emissions level of
1.736 kg bcd−1). In 2010 the worst performing UK reﬁnery
emitted 1.502 kg bcd−1. Table 2 presents these results in more
detail (see also ﬁgure 3.2 in supplementary material).
Overall it is clear that the best performing reﬁneries are in
Japan and the worst are in the UK—average normalized
benzene emissions from UK reﬁneries were approximately 37
times those of Japanese reﬁneries in 2010 and the worst UK
reﬁnery in 2010 emitted almost 21 times more benzene per
unit of capacity than the worst Japanese reﬁnery. While Japan
and more recently Germany stand out for their good perfor-
mance, the UK stands out for its poor performance, helping to
ensure that average normalized emissions rates for the EU-15
were three times those of the US in 2010, which in turn were
3.5 times those of Japan.
4. Discussion
Clearly our results depend on both the reliability of the PRTR
data underpinning the analysis. As stated above, PRTR data is
collected through monitoring protocols approved by reg-
ulatory agencies, and any misreporting of data would nor-
mally trigger legal sanctions. It can therefore be seen to be
quite robust, and it is certainly the best publically available
data on industrial emissions, but some potential for variations
in the scope and quality of the data remains.
Thereafter, a key question then emerges about the extent
to which we can attribute any variations in industrial envir-
onmental performance to differences in the regulatory stan-
dards applied in different countries. If regulation sets
minimum standards that companies generally comply with,
then lower performance can only be possible with lower
regulatory standards.
It is important to note though that higher performance
above these minimum standards need not be because of
higher regulatory standards—it could be because various
other factors lead to ‘beyond compliance’ behaviours (Gun-
ningham et al 2004). Such behaviours could be adopted
because of management cultures and practices, or because of
market pressures and technological opportunities. They may
also emerge because of private regulations and voluntary
codes and standards, or because of social regulation and civic
or NGO pressure.
Whilst this could mean that some of the variations in
industrial performance are the result of these non-regulatory
pressures, we focus on a globalized industry that is populated
by large multi-national corporations, and we consider varia-
tions in performance at the country rather than company level
and only in OECD countries with similar levels of develop-
ment. As a result, we suggest that these non-regulatory
pressures are likely to be broadly similar across all of the
countries included in the study. We therefore posit that there
is likely to be a direct and observable relationship between
industrial performance and regulatory standards, but we
recognise that this is an aspect of the research that warrants
further investigation in the future.
If we accept these points, then our ﬁndings are signiﬁcant
as they reveal signiﬁcant variations in levels of emissions of a
carcinogenic air pollutant from a widespread industrial sector.
They are of particular relevance for the regulators and
operators of reﬁneries, and for the communities that live near
to them. More broadly, of course we recognise the need to be
cautious in the extent to which we draw any wider conclu-
sions from a focused analysis. However, we argue that the
insights generated could be of great relevance in widespread
and politically charged debates about comparative standards
in environmental regulation that are often characterized by a
lack of evidence, and that they demonstrate the value of such
comparative analyses and the need for further research with a
similar approach.
A ﬁrst broader observation is that the results suggest that
at least in this case there has been a widespread but not
universal convergence in levels of industrial environmental
performance in different countries in recent years. Holzinger
et al (2011) have argued that globalization is leading to a
convergence in environmental regulations at a broad scale,
and that cross-national diffusion of innovations in environ-
mental policy is widespread, but that there is a lack of sys-
tematic knowledge as to whether this results in greater
homogeneity of national environmental policies in the long
run. Our study does not analyse the design or implementation
of national environmental policies, but it does suggest that the
outcomes of these policies may be converging, at least in the
case of benzene emissions from reﬁneries where we see
strong evidence of convergence in emissions performance in
recent years.
A second but closely related ﬁnding relates to mobility,
i.e. the extent to which convergence also coincides with
Table 2. Country Rankings (2010) by average emissions per unit of
capacity (kg bcd−1) plus worst reﬁnery in 2010.
2010
Ranking Country
Average emis-
sions in
kg bcd−1
Worst single reﬁnery
in 2010, emissions in
kg bcd−1
1 Japan 0.015 0.072
2 Germany 0.019 0.041
3 Australia 0.050 0.141
4 US 0.052 0.404
5 France 0.083 0.155
6 Italy 0.098 0.252
7 Canada 0.139 1.659
8 EU-15 0.159 1.502
9 UK 0.579 1.502
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‘processes of catching-up and changing rank between leaders
and laggards’ (Holzinger et al 2011). Again, we see clear
patterns emerging in our study, with most countries exhibiting
steady performance over time, most notably the US, but also
France and Australia. Only Germany, however, has so far
managed to catch up with the leader, namely Japan. Canada
also managed to overcome its laggard position and catch up
and even surpass countries like the US and Australia. Since
2006, however, Canada appears to have been unable to keep
pace and fell behind, but closer inspection of the data suggests
this is due to increased emissions in one reﬁnery. In addition,
there is also evidence of ‘worst ﬁrst’ regulation being enacted,
i.e. bringing worst performing oil reﬁneries into line with the
best. This is the case in all the countries under study, apart
from the UK and Canada (see ﬁgure 1).
A third ﬁnding is that despite some level of con-
vergence and catching up, the results conﬁrm that con-
siderable variability can still exist in the outcomes of
environmental regulation across different countries. Japan
exhibits the best performance by a substantial margin, while
Germany ranks second best and is steadily converging with
Japan. The US shows a linear improvement over the years,
with Australia, France, Italy and Canada converging over
time with US standards; the latter though only until 2006.
Overall, the results suggest that oil reﬁnery benzene emis-
sions in the UK are substantially higher than in other
countries, that emissions across the EU-15 and Canada are
twice the average of the US and Australia, which are in turn
twice the average of Japan.
Relatedly, a fourth major—but rather unexpected ﬁnding
—relates to the EU-15 being the main outlier, which con-
tradicts the prevailing rhetoric of it having assumed since the
1990s the place of the US as a domestic regulatory ‘hegemon’
(Bach and Newman 2007: 828). Indeed, the EU is often seen
as a far more ‘innovative, aggressive and successful regulator’
compared to the US (Rosenbaum 2007: 146). Domestic
environmental policy in Europe has over time evolved into
one of the most rapidly expanding areas of EU activity, with
its legislative corpus being currently considered amongst the
most advanced and progressive worldwide in a range of areas,
from greenhouse gas emissions trading to recycling, biosafety
and eco-labelling (Falkner 2007). In addition to advertising its
environmental leadership credentials, the EU has even
engaged in efforts to ‘globalize’ its environmental regulation
by championing international agreements that would result in
other jurisdictions adopting environmental regulations of a
comparative nature (Kelemen and Vogel 2010). But our
results reveal that there are some instances at least where the
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Figure 2. Comparison of normalized emissions measure for UK reﬁneries 2001–2010 (kg benzene/bcd capacity).
NOTES: Reﬁnery number 1 did not report emissions in 2010 and so the UK average in 2010 is for eight reﬁneries rather than
the nine for other years. To assist in the readability of this chart the years 2002, 2003, 2005 and 2006 are omitted—average
normalized emissions may have varied greatly in those years but no data was collected under the EU-PRTR.
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rhetoric does not match the reality—the outcomes of envir-
onmental regulation can be much lower in the EU than they
are in other countries. Such an observation that the EU’s
rhetoric does not match the reality has been repeatedly made
in the wider literature (cf Bretherton and Vogler 2006,
Falkner 2007).
A ﬁnal major and again closely related ﬁnding is that EU
performance is particularly skewed by the exceptionally poor
performance of the UK. Closer inspection of UK reﬁnery
performance reveals that in 2009/10 three of the nine reﬁ-
neries had normalized levels of performance that were close
to the EU average, two emitted approximately 2 times the EU
average, two emitted from 3 to 4 times the EU average and
two emitted from 6.7 to 9.5 times the EU average (see
ﬁgure 2). If we assume that there are no signiﬁcant differences
in levels of ‘beyond compliance’ behaviour in different
countries, then this must mean that the minimum regulatory
standards adopted for the majority of the reﬁneries in the UK
are substantially lower than those adopted elsewhere.
In seeking to understand the reasons why normalized
emissions levels from UK reﬁneries are higher on average
(and especially in some instances) than in other EU countries,
we conducted a small number of expert interviews with reg-
ulators, industry and pressure groups2. The responses of the
different interviewees were quite consistent, with each
respondent suggesting that the results could be the con-
sequence of three interacting issues. The ﬁrst is that there may
be some older reﬁneries in the UK that have not been
upgraded for some time and that have a legacy of under-
investment in both process and pollution control technologies.
The second is that regulators in the UK may have greater
discretion in the way that they interpret and apply regulations,
and that in exercising this discretion they may give greater
emphasis to economic concerns than in other European con-
texts. The third is that given the ﬁrst and second points, UK
regulators may pay particular attention to ambient environ-
mental quality standards when setting emissions limits, and
only require substantial investment in upgrading industrial
facilities if, for example, levels of benzene in local air quality
exceed target levels as set out for example in the EU’s air
quality framework directive. Collectively, these issues could
mean that higher emissions levels are permitted from reﬁ-
neries that are operating in contexts (i.e. on the coast where
prevailing winds disperse emissions) where air quality limits
are not exceeded, or at least where air quality monitoring does
not regularly detect such breaches.
If we exclude the UK and run the data for the remaining
EU member states we see a somewhat different picture,
whereby the EU-15 is quite close to the emissions levels of the
US and Australia (see ﬁgure 3). Such disparity among intra-EU
emissions levels serves to further highlight a key problem in
European environmental governance, namely that of ensuring
that community policies are adequately translated into on-the-
ground action (see e.g. Hunter and Smith 2005, Jordan and
Tosun 2012, Leventon and Antypas 2012, Zhelyazkova 2013).
Figure 3. Comparison of normalized emissions for OECD Countries, 1990–2010 highlighting the effect of the United Kingdom on EU
averages (see also ﬁgure 4.1 in supplementary material).
2 Interviews were conducted with a former regulator with expertize in
environmental risk and regulation, with an industrial environmental manager
with expertize in better environmental regulation and with a pressure group
lawyer with expertize in the interpretation and implementation of EU
environmental law in the UK.
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Apart from harmonization and implementation deﬁcits on the
EU level, the UK’s laggardness with respect to reducing ben-
zene emissions could reignite long-running debates on whether
the UK could be viewed as the ‘dirty man of Europe’
(Rose 1991, Börzel 2002, Revell 2005).
5. Concluding remarks
As stated above, our ﬁndings are based on two key assump-
tions; ﬁrst that PRTR data provides a sufﬁciently robust basis
for a comparative analysis that compares emissions over time
and between countries, and second that there is an observable
link between regulatory standards and industrial performance.
They are also based on a speciﬁc case that may or may not be
more broadly representative. If we accept these assumptions
and the value of the case, then the results could be signiﬁcant
in a number of ways. They suggest that there can be con-
vergence in the environmental standards that are adopted and
the levels of industrial performance that are realized in dif-
ferent countries over time, but that there are still instances
where there are major variations in the outcomes of envir-
onmental regulation between OECD countries. They indicate
that it is possible for countries to improve the outcomes of
environmental regulation and to catch up with the best stan-
dards in the world, but they also reveal that it is still possible
for some countries to adopt much lower standards than their
major competitors. They suggest that it is possible for
industry to gain a competitive disadvantage from being less
heavily regulated, and for communities to be more heavily
exposed to toxic emissions in some countries than in others.
They reinforce claims that there is no guarantee that the EU’s
rhetoric about being a leader in international environmental
policy is translated into practice, and that the outcomes of
environmental policies within the EU can remain a long way
from being harmonized. They also show that any claims that
the UK might make that it is no longer the ‘dirty man of
Europe’ are not always true.
More broadly, the paper demonstrates the value of
comparative studies of the outcomes of environmental reg-
ulation across countries and over time. There is much debate
on comparative standards in environmental regulation, but
these debates are often characterized by a lack of evidence.
Despite the potential for weaknesses in the data, we hope that
this paper has demonstrated the value of such comparative
analyses in generating such evidence and the need for further
research with a similar approach.
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